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We study the design of a decentralized platform in which workers and jobs repeatedly match, and their
future engagement with the platform depends on whether they successfully find a match. The platform
offers two types of matches to workers: an “adopted match” which entails repeatedly matching with the
same job or a one-time match. Due to randomness in match compatibility, adoption seems favorable as it
reduces uncertainty in matching. However, high adoption levels reduce the number of available jobs, which
in turn can suppress future worker engagement if the remaining workers cannot find a match. To optimally
resolve the trade-off between adoption and maintaining available options, we develop a random market model
that captures the heterogeneity in workers’ future engagement based on match type. Our analysis reveals
that the optimal policy for maximizing the matching in a single period is either full or no adoption. For
sufficiently thick markets, we show that the optimal single-period policy is also optimal for maximizing the
total discounted number of matches. In thinner markets, even though a static policy of full or no adoption can
be suboptimal, it achieves a constant-factor approximation where the factor improves with market thickness.
Key words : matching markets, optimal growth, volunteer labor, nonprofit operations
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of “gig economy” online marketplaces providing
temporary workers for jobs ranging from cleaning and dog-walking to tutoring and volunteering. At
the center of each marketplace is a platform via which workers and jobs repeatedly form matches.
Many of these platforms are decentralized, and they rely on the workers and job-posters to find
compatible matches. However, user engagement and growth frequently depend on whether past
interactions with the platform resulted in successful matches. Hence many gig economy platforms
aim to increase user engagement by improving match efficiency.
One natural tool for improving match efficiency is to encourage workers to “adopt” compatible
jobs. In an adopted match, a worker commits to repeatedly completing the same job in each period.
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Figure 1 The evolution of the number of jobs on a nonprofit platform in two different locations over the course of
30 weeks. We hypothesize that the lack of options in location (a) between weeks 1 and 15 leads to more
incomplete jobs when the number of total jobs increases. In contrast, because there are consistently
more options in location (b), job growth can occur without a corresponding increase in incomplete jobs.
As there is randomness in job compatibility, this improves match efficiency by reducing uncertainty
about whether jobs can be matched. Adoption can also lead to an increase in engagement from
both workers and jobs in the adopted matches. However, increasing adoption does not guarantee
an increase in long-term user engagement and growth. High adoption levels deplete matching
options for the remaining workers and jobs, which can reduce their future engagement, leading to
a fundamental trade-off between options and adoption.
We find evidence of this trade-off in the operations of a nonprofit platform that matches volunteer
workers to jobs in markets across the U.S. On this platform, jobs repeat weekly, and workers can
either adopt jobs on a weekly recurring basis or sign up for jobs as a non-adopter on a one-off basis.
Currently the platform has the same design for all locations. However, the growth trajectories can
be remarkably different across locations. As an example, in Figure 1, we present weekly totals of
the number of jobs on the platform in two different locations (dashed lines). Further, in the dotted
and thin solid lines we show the number of jobs that are adopted and available, respectively, at
the beginning of each week. As evident, the two markets are considerably different in the fraction
of matches which are adopted, and surprisingly the market with a higher adoption fraction has on
average more incomplete jobs (represented by the thick solid lines). We make similar observations
in other locations, based on which we hypothesize that the lack of available options can deter
non-adopters from engaging with the platform.
To optimally resolve the trade-off between options and adoption, we first develop a model for a
repeated matching market with random compatibility that captures the heterogeneity in workers’
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future engagement based on their match type. Workers and jobs arrive in discrete periods, and are
compatible with users on the other side of the market independently with identical probability.
Each match is one of two types: an adopted match, carried over across periods, or a one-time
match, newly formed in each period via a greedy matching process. User engagement and growth in
each period is endogenously governed by the volume of matches in the previous period. Motivated
by evidence from the volunteer matching platform, in our model worker engagement also depends
on whether the previous-period match was an adoption or a non-adoption, whereas job growth
depends on the volume but not the types of matches formed in the previous period.1 In a finite
horizon setting, we use this framework to optimize the level of adoption in each period with the
goal of maximizing the total discounted number of completed jobs.
A key ingredient that enables us to study the trade-off between options and adoption is our
development of a new matching function that approximates greedy matching in two-sided random
markets. We prove that the random matching process converges to a deterministic differential
equation which admits a simple closed-form solution (see Proposition 2). The resulting matching
function is increasing and concave in the size of each side of the market, much like CES functions,
which include the commonly used Cobb-Douglas function as well as the fully-efficient matching
function. Unlike these functions, it exhibits increasing returns to scale at a diminishing rate and
thus captures both the uncertainty in random matching and the impact of market thickness (see
the discussion following Proposition 2).
We use our framework to characterize the adoption policy that maximizes the number of matches
in the subsequent period. This single-period setting already captures three trade-offs in the decision
about platform adoption levels: match type influences worker growth; adoption increases match
certainty in the subsequent period; and non-adoption increases the size of the spot market of jobs
and workers not locked into an adopted match in the subsequent period. We show that the optimal
policy has an “all-or-nothing” form: either (1) full adoption is optimal, when worker growth due to
adoption is larger than worker growth from non-adoption or when the number of jobs is small; or
(2) no adoption is optimal (Theorem 1). Our proof relies on showing that the volume of matches
in the next period is quasiconvex in the adoption level.
We also study policies for maximizing the total discounted number of completed jobs. We show
that the optimal policy depends on the relative growth rates of workers in adopted matches and
workers in one-time matches. In the Adoption Growth Dominance (AGD) regime, the relative
growth rates of workers in adopted matches are higher, and we provide the intuitive result that
1 We use the terms “one-time matches” and “non-adoptions” interchangeably.
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maximizing platform adoption levels maximizes total discounted number of completed jobs (The-
orem 2). This is because there is no trade-off between short-term match efficiency and long-term
market growth.
In the complementary Adoption Growth Non-Dominance (AGN) regime, the relative growth
rates of workers in one-time matches are higher. Hence decreasing adoption increases the number
of workers in the subsequent period. We show that when the market is sufficiently thick, i.e. when
the number of workers and jobs are both sufficiently large, the optimal single-period policy of no
adoption also maximizes total discounted matches (Theorem 3). The intuition is that non-adoption
maximizes the number of workers in the subsequent spot market; given a sufficiently thick spot
market, an increased total number of workers results in an increased total number of completed
jobs, regardless of the adoption fraction. As a consequence, when the market is both sufficiently
thick and growing, a policy of no adoption maximizes matches in every future period. We also
show that for insufficiently thick markets in the AGN regime, the policy of no adoption achieves
a constant-factor approximation, where the approximation factor improves with market thickness
(Theorem 4). More generally, our analysis provides insight as to how to use commitment levels to
influence the growth of a two-sided matching platform.
Our work is motivated by a collaboration with a nonprofit platform that operates a volunteer
labor market. Non-monetary tools for influencing match efficiency, such as adoption, are espe-
cially critical in volunteer labor markets, as financial resources are limited and volunteers respond
negatively to underutilization. In our particular volunteer market, both adopted and non-adopted
matches are permitted. Our results suggest that a unified platform design for all markets may be
suboptimal, as markets have different levels of thickness and the engagement behavior of jobs and
workers can vary across locations. Markets with a sufficiently large number of adoptions (such as
location (a) in Figure 1) may benefit from limiting further adoption.
1.1. Related Literature
This paper contributes to the growing literature on designing dynamic matching platforms. A
number of works study the trade-off between current matches and future match efficiency, such
as in ridesharing (Ozkan and Ward 2017, Ma et al. 2018), kidney exchange (Akbarpour et al.
2017, Anderson et al. 2017, Ashlagi et al. 2018, 2019), and other markets (Loertscher et al. 2016,
Baccara et al. 2018). We consider a similar trade-off in a setting where current matches affect
future matches through user growth. Previous literature finds that limiting information and/or
available actions on two-sided platforms can improve welfare, primarily through reducing search
frictions (Halaburda et al. 2017, Kanoria and Saban 2017, Arnosti et al. 2018). Here, we focus on
the lever of commitment in a repeated matching market and find that providing restrictions on
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different match types can increase the long-run number of matches. Most of the previous work
on dynamic matching focuses on improving the matching of heterogeneous agents and items, e.g.
in housing allocation (Bloch and Houy 2012, Kurino 2014, Arnosti and Shi 2017, Leshno 2017),
kidney exchange (Zenios 2002, Su and Zenios 2005, Dickerson et al. 2012), and other application
areas (Feigenbaum et al. 2017, Hu and Zhou 2018, Chen and Hu 2019). We consider a repeated
setting with ex ante homogeneous jobs and workers, and we focus on how commitment to matches
affects match volume through user engagement and growth.
Within the literature on two-sided marketplace design, the most closely related paper is Lian
and van Ryzin (2019), which provides a theoretical framework for optimal growth in a two-sided
revenue-maximizing marketplace. Their theory relies on a Cobb-Douglas matching function, as
well as price levers for both sides of the market; this formulation allows them to characterize the
optimal market balance and pricing policy to promote growth and maximize expected discounted
profit. Similarly to Lian and van Ryzin (2019), we provide a theoretical formulation where user
growth depends endogenously on the volume of past matches. However the structure of our optimal
policies differ substantially, as we consider a setting without prices where the only lever is the type
of matching. In order to capture uncertainty in matching and study the effects of adopted matches,
we develop a novel framework using a different matching function. To our knowledge, our work
is one of the first to address the question of growth in a two-sided matching platform without
monetary transactions.
Our study also contributes to the literature on improving labor management. In the nonprofit
space, Ata et al. (2016) consider the problem of volunteer management in gleaning operations, and
use dynamic control techniques to provide optimal staffing policies for maximizing the volume of
food gleaned in the presence of food and labor uncertainties. Similarly Green et al. (2013) and
Dong and Ibrahim (2017) study how to maximize the volume of completed jobs in call centers and
hospitals when managerial decisions affect labor participation rates. There is also a growing body
of work on how volunteer management should differ from traditional labor management given the
unique characteristics of volunteer labor and retention (see e.g. Locke et al. (2003) and Sampson
(2006) for overviews of these areas). Our setting is partially motivated by the volunteer labor
market, and we similarly consider how to manage volunteers to improve operational and allocative
efficiency.
2. Model Description
In this section, we formally introduce our model of a repeated matching market as well as the
design problem that the platform faces when attempting to optimally use workers to complete
jobs over a finite time horizon. In Section 2.1, we describe the dynamics of our model and show
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that, properly scaled, our system converges to a deterministic dynamic. Then, in Section 2.2 we
formalize the platform’s design problem.
2.1. Model Dynamics
The market starts at an initial state and evolves over T periods. At the beginning of period t∈ [T ],
there are Dt jobs that require one worker, and on the other side of the market, there are Vt workers
who are willing to complete one job.2 Recall that the platform allows for adoption, which implies
that some jobs and workers present at time t have already been matched. In particular, Kt pairs
of workers and jobs begin period t as part of an adopted match, where Kt ≤min{Vt,Dt}.
Matching Process: We now describe how workers and jobs match on the platform. In a given
period, all workers who are not already committed to a job via adoption would like to match with
one job; however, workers are not always compatible with the time or location of a particular job.
We assume that jobs and workers are compatible with some identical probability, independently
across pairs and time periods.
During each period, some workers and jobs are already part of an adopted match. All others
become part of that period’s spot market, where workers match with jobs in a decentralized man-
ner. We model the matching process as sequentially greedy. Specifically, (1) workers arrive to the
platform in a random order, (2) upon arrival, a worker checks the available jobs for compatibility,
and (3) the worker matches if she finds a compatible job (breaking ties at random). At the conclu-
sion of the matching process in period t, a total of Mt pairs of workers and jobs have been matched,
either from prior fixed matches or from the spot market in period t, where Mt ≤min{Vt,Dt}.
Platform’s Match Type Decision: Even though the platform has no control over the decen-
tralized matching process, it controls the types of the matches formed. In particular, the platform
determines the fraction of matches in period t which will be adopted going forward. We denote
this fraction by zt. We make the simplifying assumption that the platform can vary zt between 0
and 1, meaning that the platform can terminate previous fixed matches (e.g. by making the job
generally available) or can require that all new matches are adoptions.3
Job Dynamics: As discussed in Section 1, we consider settings where jobs recur, so the number
of jobs in the market in one period is closely related to the number of jobs in the subsequent
period. If a job is not completed, it may be removed from the platform, e.g. an alternate source of
labor may be used to complete the job in the future. On the other hand, if the job is completed—
whether as part of an adopted match or a one-time match—it is more likely that additional jobs
2 For ease of notation, for any a∈N, we use [a] to refer to the set {0,1,2, . . . , a}.
3 In the setting we consider, the platform can implement this level of control by making minor adjustments to its
website. In settings where this level of control is impractical, the structure of our results is maintained.
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will be added to the market. To reflect this in the model, we assume that jobs will leave the market
independently with probability β if they do not get completed in the previous period. However, if
a job is completed in period t, then with probability β′−β, an additional job enters the market in
the subsequent period, where β′ >β. Thus, the expected number of jobs in period t+ 1 is given by
E[Dt+1|Dt,Mt] = (1−β)(Dt−Mt) + (1 +β′−β)Mt
= (1−β)Dt +β′Mt (1)
In this model, departures occur at a fixed rate while growth is proportional to the the number of
matches. Since there is no money in this setting, the number of matches can be viewed as a measure
of the surplus earned by the job side of the market. As a consequence, in our model the growth
of the job side of the market is proportional to its surplus. Modeling growth in such a manner is
broadly consistent with the matching market literature (see e.g. Lian and van Ryzin (2019)).
Worker Dynamics: We now turn our attention to the evolution of the number of workers.
As discussed in Section 1, the future engagement of workers with the platform depends not only
on whether or not the worker is matched but also on the type of her match. To capture this in
our model, we consider three different dropout probabilities for the three different possible worker
outcomes. (1) Unmatched workers drop out with probability α. (2) Workers who are part of an
adopted match drop out with probability γ.4 Naturally, we expect α> γ. (3) Workers who are part
of a one-time match drop out with probability (α−α′). The parameter α′ captures the impact of
getting matched on the worker’s future engagement with the platform.5 In the context of volunteer
labor, previous work confirms such behavior: if a volunteer feels underutilized, they will be less
engaged in the future (Sampson 2006). Though we expect α> γ, the relationship between α−α′
and γ is unclear, and as we will see in Section 3, it plays an important role in determining the
optimal platform design. Similar to how we modeled job growth, we assume that as a result of each
match, a new worker joins the market with probability γ′, i.e., external growth is proportional to
the surplus of the worker side of the market.
Based on these modeling choices, we can specify the expected number of both adopted matches
and workers in each period. As a result of the matching in period t, there are ztMt adopted matches
and (1− zt)Mt one-time matches. Since adopters (i.e., workers who are part of an adopted match)
will drop out with probability γ, the expected number of adopted matches at the start of period
t+ 1 is given by
E[Kt+1|Mt, zt] = (1− γ)ztMt (2)
4 If an adopter leaves the platform, we assume its corresponding job will enter the spot market in the subsequent
period. This simplifying assumption is reasonable in the setting we consider, where workers are homogeneous.
5 We highlight that α′ can be thought of as a decrease in workers’ dropout rate or as an increase in the rate at which
workers sign up for jobs.
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Similarly, based on the dynamics described above for the three different possible worker outcomes,
the expected number of workers at the start of period t+ 1 is given by:
E[Vt+1|Vt,Mt, zt] =(1−α)(Vt−Mt) (unmatched workers)
+ (1 + γ′− γ)ztMt (adopters)
+ (1 + γ′+α′−α)(1− zt)Mt (matched non-adopters)
=(1−α)Vt + (α′+ γ′)Mt + (α−α′− γ)ztMt (3)
Note that the last line is the more compact (but less interpretable) representation of the dynamic.
We highlight that the expected number of workers in period t+ 1 is increasing (decreasing) in the
prior fraction of adopted matches zt if α−α′ is greater than (less than) γ.
In Proposition 1, we show that the state variables {Dt,Kt, Vt, : t ∈ [T ]} and the matching out-
comes {Mt : t∈ [T ]} are concentrated around their expectations when the market size is large. Such
concentration results enable us to approximate the multi-dimensional stochastic process by simple
deterministic dynamics. This in turn provides the tractability needed to analyze the impact of the
platform’s decisions on the dynamics of the system. We note that such an approach is common
when studying design questions in complex stochastic systems (see e.g. Crapis et al. (2017), Afeche
et al. (2018))
Proposition 1 (Deterministic Approximation for System Dynamics). For all n > 1,
some fixed c > 0, and all t ∈ [T ], suppose that (Dnt ,Knt , V nt ) represents the state of the system in
period t assuming the initial conditions are given by (nd0, nk0, nv0)∈R3+, the platform decisions are
given by z = {zt : zt ∈ [0,1] ∀t∈ [T ]}, and the match probability is given by cn .6 In addition, suppose
that Mnt represents the number of completed jobs in period t. Then for all t ∈ [T ], the following
limits hold almost surely as n approaches infinity:
Mnt
n
→ mt = s(dt− kt, vt− kt) + kt (4)
Dnt+1
n
→ dt+1 = (1−β)dt +β′mt (5)
Knt+1
n
→ kt+1 = (1− γ)ztmt (6)
V nt+1
n
→ vt+1 = (1−α)vt + (α′+ γ′)mt + (α−α′− γ)ztmt (7)
where the matching function s(·, ·) is defined in (8).7
6 We note that for some n, it may not be possible to have a system with these initial conditions, e.g. nd0 is not an
integer. Thus a more accurate statement is to consider the subsequence n1, n2, . . . such that the initial conditions are
all integers and c
n1
≤ 1. However, for the sake of brevity we do not mention this in our statements.
7 In the statement of this proposition, we use capital (resp. lower case) letters for our state variables (resp. approxi-
mations) to highlight that they are random (resp. deterministic) variables.
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The parameter c represents the expected number of available and compatible jobs for each worker
when there are exactly n available jobs, or equivalently, the expected number of available and
compatible workers for each job when there are exactly n available workers. A proof of Proposition
1 can be found in the appendix, while a characterization of the matching function s(·, ·) can be
found in Section 3.1.
2.2. Platform Optimization Problem
The platform wants to maximize the number of completed jobs between periods t= 1 and t= T .
Since different platforms may place different relative weights on current and future success, we
allow for the value of a completed job to be discounted at a rate δ ∈ [0,1].
In each period t, the platform decides the fraction of adopted matches, i.e., the fraction that are
fixed going into the next period, which we denote as zt ∈ [0,1]. In extreme cases, by setting zt = 1,
the platform can require that each matched pair in period t is part of an adopted match. On the
other hand, by setting zt = 0, the platform can dissolve all matches—including adopted matches
from the prior period—and make all jobs available in the spot market of period t+ 1 (or anything
in between).8
Given that the system follows the deterministic dynamics described in Proposition 1, for any
initial condition (d, k, v), the platform design problem (PD) is to decide on the level of adoption
in each period in order to maximize the total discounted number of completed jobs. Table 1
summarizes (PD).
Table 1 The platform design problem.
max
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1mt (PD)
{zt,mt,dt,kt,vt:t∈[T ]}
s.t. mt = kt + s(dt− kt, vt− kt) ∀t∈ [T ]
dt+1 = (1−β)dt +β′mt ∀t∈ [T − 1]
kt+1 = (1− γ)ztmt ∀t∈ [T − 1]
vt+1 = (1−α)vt + (α′+ γ′)mt + (α−α′− γ)ztmt ∀t∈ [T − 1]
d0 = d, k0 = k, v0 = v, zt ∈ [0,1] ∀t∈ [T ]
8 Forcing each new match to be an adopted match may not be achievable in practice. We remark that all of our
results go through with minor adjustments when restricting the domain of zt to [z, z¯], though we omit the details for
the sake of brevity.
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3. Main Results
We now present our analysis of the platform design problem. In Section 3.1, we derive a deter-
ministic approximation for the matching process described in Section 2.1. Then, in Section 3.2,
we characterize the platform’s optimal policy in a single-period version of the problem. Based on
insights from the single-period model, in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we separately study the platform
design problem for two regimes depending on the relationship between γ and (α − α′), i.e. the
asymmetric dropout rates for workers in adopted matches and workers in one-time matches. We
show a stark difference in the optimal policy for the two regimes.
3.1. Characterizing the Matching Function
As described in Section 2.1, we model the random matching process as sequentially greedy, i.e.,
workers arrive in a random order and match with any available, compatible job (breaking ties
randomly). Because workers and jobs are both assumed to be homogeneous populations, neither the
arrival order nor the individual outcomes affect the process. The following proposition establishes
that in a large market, the size of the matching is well concentrated around its expected size, which
is itself the unique solution to a simple differential equation.
Proposition 2 (Deterministic Approximation for the Matching Process). Given two
values (a, b)∈R2+, suppose that for all n> 1, Snt represents the number of matches in a market with
sides of size na and nb where the match probability is given by c
n
and the matching is governed by
a sequentially greedy process. Then the following limit holds almost surely:
Snt
n
→ s(a, b) = a+ b− 1
c
log(eca + ecb− 1) (8)
Proposition 2 provides a simple matching function for a two-sided market when matches are
formed greedily and compatibilities are random and homogeneous. As such, it may have application
in other studies of matching markets.
Two other commonly used matching functions are Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale,
i.e., µ1(a, b) = a
ρb1−ρ for some ρ∈ (0,1), and fully-efficient matching, i.e., µ2(a, b) = min{a, b}. Like
both of these alternatives, the matching function s(a, b) is (1) increasing and concave in the size of
each side of the market, and (2) if one side of the market is empty, no matching occurs.
However, our model diverges from these alternatives in two key ways. (1) If there is randomness
in compatibility, then increasing both sides of the market by the same small constant  should
increase the size of the matching by less than . Our matching function captures this, i.e., d
d
s(a+
, b+)< 1, but the Cobb-Douglas and fully-efficient matching functions do not satisfy this property
( d
d
µ1(a+ , b+ )≥ 1, and ddµ2(a+ , b+ ) = 1).9 (2) If thickness improves the match efficiency,
9 This critical property ensures that there is randomness in matching, or equivalently, that the certainty provided by
an adopted match is valuable relative to a corresponding increase in the size of the spot market.
Lo et al.: Options versus Adoption
11
then the matching should exhibit increasing returns to scale. Our matching function satisfies this
property, while µ1(a, b) and µ2(a, b) both have constant returns to scale. Though our matching
function exhibits increasing returns to scale, it does so at at a diminishing rate, and it approaches
the fully-efficient matching function in the limit: lima,b→∞ s(a, b) = min{a, b}. Thus, this matching
function is consistent with a market that gets more efficient as it grows while also respecting the
physical limitation that the size of the matching cannot exceed the size of either side. We also
remark that the size of the matching is increasing in the compatibility probability.
The proof of Proposition 2 is a generalization of Theorem 3 in Mastin and Jaillet (2013) and
makes use of stochastic differential approximation techniques from Wormald et al. (1999). In Section
4, we numerically show the accuracy of this approximation.
Proof of Proposition 2 Based on the greedy random matching process, if there are na available
jobs when a worker arrives, she will form a match with probability 1− (1− c
n
)na. As a consequence,
the expected number of available jobs when the next worker arrives is given by na− 1 + (1− c
n
)na.
This insight enables us to write a stochastic differential equation for the number of matched jobs.
We then show that the matching converges to the solution of a deterministic differential equation
as the market size grows, holding fixed the expected number of jobs compatible with each worker.
Recall that the market has sides of size na (which we will refer to as jobs) and nb (which we will
refer to as workers).
Let Y (Z) be the number of matched jobs right before the Zth worker arrives in the spot market.
According to the matching process, we have Y (0) = 0 and
E[Y (Z + 1)|Y (Z)] = Y (Z) + 1−
(
1− c
n
)n(a−Y (Z)n )
(9)
If we define y(z) = Y (nz)
n
, then for large n,
E[y(z+ 1
n
)− y(z)|y(z)]
1/n
= 1− e−c(a−y(z)) + o(1)10 (10)
As n→∞, this corresponds to the differential equation dy
dz
= 1 − e−c(a−y(z)). Given the initial
condition y(0) = 0, this differential equation has the unique solution
y(z) = a+ z− 1
c
log(eca + ecz − 1) (11)
To show convergence, we apply techniques from Wormald et al. (1999), deferring the details to
Appendix B.1. To find the number of matches after bn workers have arrived, we plug z = b into
(11), which yields
Snt
n
a.s.→ a+ b− 1
c
log(eca + ecb− 1) = s(a, b) (12)

10 For two functions d, l :N→R, l(n) = o(d(n)) if limn→∞ l(n)d(n) = 0.
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3.2. Optimal Policy for a Single-Period Problem
In this section, we consider an instance of the problem where T = 1, or equivalently an instance
where the discount rate δ equals 0. In such a setting, the platform chooses z0 with the intention of
maximizing m1(z0).
11
Before presenting the structure of the optimal policy, we provide some intuition. First note that
z0 does not impact the number of completed jobs in period 0 (accordingly, d1 as defined in (5) is
independent of z0). However, it impacts m1 in three ways. (1) The match type influences the growth
of the worker pool. (2) Adoption replaces the randomness in matching with certainty. However, (3)
one-time matches ensure that the spot market in the subsequent period will be large. To compare
the relative impact of effects (2) and (3), note that with certainty, each such adoption is worth 1
match; however, increasing both sides of the spot market by 1 in the next period is worth less than
1 additional match due to randomness in matching. Therefore if adopted matches are preferable
for growing the worker pool (i.e., if γ ≤ α−α′), we would expect a policy of only adoption (z0 = 1)
to be optimal. On the other hand, when one-time matches lead to more growth in the worker pool
(i.e., γ > α′−α) then no adoption can be preferable if the spot market is efficient enough, i.e., if
increasing both sides of the spot market by 1 is worth close to 1 additional match.12
As discussed after Proposition 2, the match efficiency in the spot market of period 1 depends on
its thickness. If both sides are large, then the matching is efficient (recall that in the extreme case,
lima,b→∞ s(a, b) = min{a, b}). Replacing an adopted match with a one-time match increases the
size of the spot market in the following period, which implies that the marginal value of one-time
matches should get larger as the adoption fraction decreases. Put another way, we would expect
m1, the number of matches in the next period, to be quasiconvex in z0, the fraction of adopted
matches, leading to an ‘all-or-nothing’ optimal policy in the single-period problem.
In the left panel of Figure 2, we show an example where the spot market is not thick enough
and exhibits poor match efficiency. In that example, the optimal single-period policy is to have
only adoption (z0 = 1). In the right panel, we consider the same model primitives but with larger
initial sides of the market, which leads to having a thicker spot market in period 1. Since match
efficiency is higher, the optimal single-period policy is to have no adoption (z0 = 0).
In both examples, an ‘all-or-nothing’ policy is indeed optimal. In the following theorem, we
confirm that in any single-period problem, the platform either wants as many adopted matches as
possible, or the platform wants to create as thick of a spot market in the next period as possible
by eliminating adoption.
11 With a slight abuse of notation, we augment m1 by z0 to highlight the role of the decision variable.
12 We expect the exact threshold to depend on the gap γ−α′+α.
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Figure 2 Plotting m1(z0) when when (α,α
′, γ, γ′, β, β′) = (0.2,0.15,0.06,0.2,0.05,0.2) and c = 10. Left: For ini-
tial state (d0, k0, v0) = (0.8,0,0.8), full adoption maximizes m1. Right: For initial state (d0, k0, v0) =
(2.8,0,2.8), eliminating adoption maximizes m1
Theorem 1 (Optimal Policy in a Single-Period Problem). Given an initial state
(d0, k0, v0), the optimal single-period policy is either full adoption or no adoption. In particular,
z∗0 =
{
1, if γ ≤ α−α′ or d1 ≤ 1c log
(
ec(1+α
′−α)m0−1
ec(γ+α
′−α)m0−1
)
0, otherwise
(13)
If γ ≤ α−α′, the worker pool grows more per adopted match than per one-time match. Since this
means that adoption provides both growth and certainty (i.e., there is no trade-off between growth
and certainty), the platform prefers adopted matches in this regime regardless of the state of the
system. In Section 3.3, we show that in this regime, the static policy of full adoption is also optimal
in the multi-period version.
When γ > α− α′, adoption is optimal in the single-period problem only if the number of jobs
is below a threshold, either because the spot market is not thick enough to be efficient or because
there is an abundance of workers. However, once the number of jobs is sufficiently large, no adoption
proves superior because the spot market is thick (and thus, efficient).13
To prove Theorem 1, we first show that m1(z0) is quasiconvex. This implies that either no
adopted matches (z0 = 0) or all adopted matches (z0 = 1) is the single-period optimal solution. We
then show that m1(1)≥m1(0) when either γ ≤ α− α′ or d1 ≤ 1c log
(
ec(1−α
′−α)m0−1
ec(γ−α′−α)m0−1
)
. A complete
proof can be found in Appendix B.2. In Section 4, we numerically show that the structure of the
optimal single-period policy holds even when we consider the actual expected size of the matching
(as opposed to its deterministic approximation).
13 We remark that the threshold depends on the model primitives (including the gap between γ and α−α′) as well
as m0, which is uniquely determined by the initial state.
Lo et al.: Options versus Adoption
14
3.3. Optimal Policy in the Adoption Growth Dominance Regime
In this section, we focus on instances where γ ≤ α− α′, which we will call the Adoption Growth
Dominance (AGD) regime. In this regime, having more adoption will increase the number of workers
in the subsequent period, i.e., vt+1(zt) as defined in (7) is increasing in zt. In addition, Theorem
1 implies that mt+1(zt) is maximized at zt = 1. Thus, in the AGD regime there is no trade-off
between long-term market growth and short-term certainty in matching. Increasing the adoption
fraction will improve both objectives. We formalize this in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Optimal Policy in the AGD regime). In the AGD regime (i.e., γ ≤ α−α′),
the optimal policy is z∗t = 1 for all t∈ [T ].
Theorem 2 establishes that a policy of only adoption is optimal in the AGD regime. This intuitive
result suggests that unless one-time matches provide significant gains in worker engagement (and
therefore growth), the platform should promote adoption.
To prove Theorem 2, we use Theorem 1 to show that in the AGD regime, the optimal single-
period policy (i.e., the optimal myopic policy) is always zt = 1. Thus, it is sufficient to show that
when the optimal myopic policy also increases the worker pool, then it is the optimal policy in the
long-run as well. We use the following lemma to establish this result.
Lemma 1 (Optimality Condition for the Myopic Policy). Let z′τ be the optimal myopic
policy given state (dτ , kτ , vτ ). Then z
′
τ is the optimal policy in period τ if z
′
τ ∈ argmaxzτ∈[0,1]vτ+1(zτ ).
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider two policies zˆ = {zˆt : t ∈ [T ]} and z˜ = {z˜t : t ∈ [T ]} that differ only
at time τ , where zˆτ = z
′
τ and z˜τ 6= z′τ . Using identical notation to denote the state variables when
following each policy, we have mˆτ+1 ≥ m˜τ+1. In addition, when the condition in Lemma 1 holds,
we have vˆτ+1 ≥ v˜τ+1, and by the dynamics described in (5), dˆτ+1 ≥ d˜τ+1. To complete the proof, we
must show that these conditions imply mˆt ≥ m˜t for all t ∈ [T ] \ [τ ]. We use the following claim to
establish this result:
Claim 1 (Pathwise Dominance of Superior State). Suppose the platform’s decisions zt
are fixed for all t ∈ [T ′] where T ′ ≤ T . In that case, for any two initial states (d0, k0, v0) and
(d′0, k
′
0, v
′
0), if d0 ≥ d′0, v0 ≥ v′0, and m0 ≥m′0, then for all t∈ [T ′], dt ≥ d′t, vt ≥ v′t, and mt ≥m′t.
We defer the proof of this claim to Appendix B.3. Since zˆt = z˜t for all t∈ [T ] \ [τ ], we can apply
Claim 1 to the initial states (dˆτ+1 kˆτ+1, vˆτ+1) and (d˜τ+1, k˜τ+1, v˜τ+1) for T
′ = T − τ − 1 to show that
mˆt ≥ m˜t for all t ∈ [T ] \ [τ ]. Therefore, by replacing the decision in period τ with z′τ , the platform
can only increase the total number of completed jobs. Using a contradiction argument, no policy
with zτ 6= z′τ can be strictly optimal. This completes the proof that z′τ (the optimal myopic policy)
is the optimal policy in period τ .14 
14 Note that in the presence of multiple optimal policies, we follow the convention of choosing the myopically optimal
one.
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3.4. Optimal Policy in the Adoption Growth Non-Dominance Regime
As discussed above, in the AGD regime, there is no trade-off between short-term certainty in
matching and long-term market growth. We now turn our attention to the regime where one-time
matches are better for long-term market growth, i.e., when γ > α−α′. We call this the Adoption
Growth Non-Dominance (AGN) regime. In this regime, the market can choose to promote the
growth of the worker side of the market by reducing adoption and correspondingly increasing the
size of the spot market in the subsequent period.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, when zt = 0 is myopically optimal in the AGN regime, no adoption
is the optimal policy in period t. As established in Theorem 1, zt = 0 is optimal in a single-period
problem if γ > α− α′ and the number of jobs exceeds a threshold. In other words, no adoption
is optimal in the AGN regime if the spot market is thick enough that the benefits of short-term
certainty are immediately offset by the benefits of worker growth.
If the number of jobs continues to grow beyond that threshold, a no-adoption policy will remain
optimal. Based on this insight, we can characterize the optimal policy in the AGN regime when
the market is sufficiently large.
Theorem 3 (Optimal Policy in the AGN regime). In the AGN regime (i.e., γ > α−α′),
if dτ ≥ d¯, and vτ ≥ v¯, then zt = 0 is optimal for all t ∈ [T ] \ [τ − 1], where d¯ and v¯ are the unique
solutions to the minimum market size program defined in (MMS).
min
d,v
d (MMS)
s.t. d≥ 1
c(1−β) log
(
1 +α′−α
γ+α′−α
)
(14)
d≥ 1
c(1−β) log
(
ec(1+α
′−α)d− 1
ec(γ+α′−α)d− 1
)
− β
′
1−βd (15)
d≥1
c
log
(
ecv − 1
e
cv(1− α
α′+γ′ )− 1
)
(16)
v≥1
c
log
(
ecd− 1
e
cd(1− β
β′ )− 1
)
(17)
Theorem 3 shows that in the AGN regime, once the market gets sufficiently thick, a static no-
adoption policy is optimal for the remainder of the time horizon. In Figure 3 we provide a visual
example of the thresholds d¯ and v¯ using dashed lines. Note that the model primitives for this
example belong to the AGN regime. Figure 3 also provides a visualization for how the myopically
optimal policy compares to the simulated optimal policy.
Specifically, in Figure 3, (1) the solid curve represents the threshold at which the myopically
optimal policy changes. To the left of the curve, the resulting spot market is thin so z0 = 1 is
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Figure 3 For model primitives (α,α′, γ, γ′, β, β′) = (0.2,0.15,0.06,0.2,0.05,0.2), c = 10, δ = 0.6, and T = 15, the
plot describes the following features: the threshold where the optimal single-period policy changes
(solid line); the absorbing state defined by d¯ and v¯ (dashed lines); at each point (d, v), for an initial
state (d0, k0, v0) = (d,0, v), the long-run optimal policy (arrow color, blue for z
∗
0 = 1 and red for z
∗
0 = 0),
and the direction of the state transitions when following the optimal policy (arrow magnitude and
direction).
myopically optimal, while to the right, z0 = 0 is myopically optimal. (2) The color of the arrow at
a point (d, v) represents the long-run optimal decision at the state (d,0, v). A blue arrow indicates
an optimal policy of z∗0 = 1, while a red arrow indicates that z
∗
0 = 0. We remark all arrows to the
right of the curve are red, as are some arrows to the left of the curve. In other words, even if
adoption is myopically optimal, it can be sub-optimal when considering a longer time horizon due
to its negative impact on worker growth. (3) The direction of the arrow indicates how the size of
the worker and job pools will change in the subsequent period when following the optimal policy
z∗0 . (4) The dashed lines represent the thresholds d¯ and v¯ defined in Theorem 3, which outline an
absorbing state where z∗t = 0 is optimal for all t ∈ [T ]. We remark that all arrows are red beyond
those thresholds, and all arrows along the boundary point into the region.
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on appropriately interpreting the constraints in (MMS). Con-
straints (14) and (15) are sufficient conditions to ensure one-time matches are myopically optimal.
Constraint (16) (resp. (17)) ensures that the number of workers (resp. jobs) will increase in the
subsequent period assuming there is no adoption. We use these constraints to show that {(d, v) :
d ≥ d¯, v ≥ v¯} is an absorbing state. When applied iteratively, this proves that zt = 0 is optimal
for all t ∈ [T ] \ [τ − 1]. In Appendix B.4, we present a rigorous proof of Theorem 3 which also
demonstrates that the unique solution to (MMS) can be found via linear search.
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If the market size is below the threshold specified by Theorem 3, the optimal decision proves
difficult to characterize, since the problem is not convex in the decision variables z. However, our
numerical analysis indicates that the optimal decisions are always zt = 0 or zt = 1, resembling
the ‘all-or-nothing’ optimal myopic policy. Further, if the horizon is long enough, we numerically
observe that the optimal policy is either no adoption (i.e., z∗t = 0 for all t ∈ [T ]) or it is initially
adoption before switching to no adoption (i.e., for some τ , the optimal policy is z∗t = 1 for all t∈ [τ ]
and z∗t = 0 for all t∈ [T ]\ [τ ]). In these cases, even though we cannot theoretically characterize the
optimal policy, we can offer a guarantee on the performance of a static policy of no adoption.
Theorem 4 (Approximately Optimal Policy in the AGN regime). Let r = δmax{1 −
β + β′,1− α+ α′ + γ′}. In the AGN regime (i.e., γ > α− α′), the policy z∗t = 0 for all t ∈ [T ] is
1−κ optimal, where
κ= min{
1
1−rT +
max{β′,α′+γ′}
1−r
cmin{d0, v0} log 2,1}. (18)
Theorem 4 establishes a ratio between the performance of a no-adoption policy and the optimal
policy. The ratio approaches 1 as the market size cmin{d0, v0} grows, and the ratio also improves
the more the platform discounts the future. If r≤ 1− 1+max{β′,α′+γ′}
cmin{v0,d0} log 2, then our approximation
factor is non-trivial. In the example shown in Figure 3, a policy of no adoption at the initial
condition (d0, v0) = (0.5,0.5) achieves an approximation ratio of 0.704.
To prove Theorem 4, we first upper bound the achievable number of completed jobs by consid-
ering a setting where the matching process is perfectly efficient, i.e., the number of matches is the
minimum of the two sides of the spot market. Using this matching function in the AGN regime,
we can exactly characterize the optimal policy as z∗t = 0 for all t ∈ [T ]. We then directly compare
this upper bound on the number of completed jobs to the number of completed jobs when the
matching process is governed by (8) and the platform follows the same no-adoption policy. We
show that the matching outcome given by (8) is within log(2) of the minimum side of the market.
Propogating this gap over the time horizon yields the ratio in Theorem 4. The full proof can be
found in Appendix B.5.
4. Matching Function Approximation Accuracy
Our insights in the previous section are based on deterministic approximations to the system
dynamics. In this section, we numerically demonstrate the accuracy of our approximations for
reasonable system sizes, and we discuss how some of our main structural results continue to apply.
Numerical analysis shows that the matching function s(a, b) defined in (8) is always an underes-
timate of the actual expected matching, but it becomes increasingly accurate as n gets large. This
is evident in Figure 4a in which we show the gap between the expected size of the matching and
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Figure 4 Left: Convergence to the deterministic approximation of the matching function when both sides of the
market are of size n and the compatibility probability is c/n. Right: Comparing the expected value
of m1(z0) to its deterministic approximation in an identical setting to Figure 2a, except with initial
condition (d0, k0, v0) = (0.8,0.8,0.8) to ensure the integrality of nm0.
its corresponding deterministic approximation (defined in (8)) normalized by the matching size.
We observe that the normalized gap is always positive, and it is below 2% when the size of both
sides is at least 30.
In addition, the structure of the optimal single-period solution appears unchanged; numerical
results indicate that an ‘all-or-nothing’ policy continues to be optimal. In Figure 4b, we use simu-
lation to find the expected number of matches for various levels of adoption, and we compare those
results to our deterministic approximation. We make the following observations from the plot: (1)
the shape of m1(z0), i.e., the deterministic approximation, is broadly consistent with the simulated
results. However, (2) the deterministic matching function is always an underestimate, and (3) the
gap is smallest at z0 = 1, when most of the matching is pre-determined due to adoption. The latter
two observations imply that the deterministic approximation relatively overvalues adoption. This
insight leads us to conjecture that if the optimal single-period policy according to the deterministic
approximation is zt = 0 (i.e., if neither condition in (13) holds), then the optimal single-period
policy is zt = 0 when considering the actual expected matching.
5. Discussion
We conclude with some discussion and directions for future work.
Benefits of Non-Adoption. We have shown that although adoption increases match certainty,
in some settings the policy of no adoption can maximize the total number of discounted matches.
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In such settings, the growth benefits of non-adoption can outweigh the loss in match certainty. We
remark that a number of our modeling choices have overvalued the benefit of adoption relative
to non-adoption. (1) We assume that the probability of compatibility between a given job and
worker is redrawn every period, unless the the worker-job pair is part of an adopted match carried
over from the previous period; in the repeated matching setting, it is reasonable to assume that
a worker matched with a job in period t will likely still be compatible with the job in period
t + 1 regardless of the match type. Consequently, the loss in match certainty due to low levels
of adoption is less than what our model accounts for. (2) Our numerical analysis in Section 4
suggests that our deterministic matching function is an underestimate of the true expected size of
the greedy matching, and that the error is larger as a percentage of the total number of completed
jobs for small z (low adoption levels). Intuitively, this suggests that the case for the optimality of
non-adoption is stronger in more practical settings, meaning that non-adoption may be optimal
for settings beyond those that we have identified.
Benefits of Adoption. We have shown that in the AGD regime, where adopter growth domi-
nates non-adopter growth, a static policy of full adoption is optimal. This finding holds true beyond
the specific assumptions of our model and the specific form of our deterministic matching function.
For example, when using the actual expected matching instead of the deterministic approximation,
we can directly prove that adoption is optimal in the AGD regime by extending Theorem 2. Said
differently, the proof of this result does not rely on the explicit functional form of s(a, b) but rather
on the structural properties of the underlying matching process, and so the result holds without
appealing to the deterministic approximation. Adjusting the proof of Theorem 2 to a more general
setting would involve an inductive coupling argument showing that in a single-period dynamic,
the number of jobs, workers, and matches are largest under a policy of full adoption. We omit the
details for the sake of brevity.
Commitment as a Design Lever. The literature on designing two-sided matching markets is
rich and varied, and there have been a multitude of papers studying how to optimize centralized
matching as well as how to design levers such as pricing, search, and information. To our knowl-
edge, our work is one of the first to suggest that the level of commitment to a match is also a
design lever that can be influenced by the platform. Such a lever is potentially useful for a wide
range of settings where matchings are repeated over time, and our results provide a framework for
evaluating the trade-offs. For example, in managing gig economy workers, a platform may consider
creating a blended workforce where some workers lock in their shifts; our results suggest this may
reduce options available for flexible workers, which in turn may reduce their engagement. Looked
at from another perspective, a consumer-focused platform that provides repeated service by gig
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economy workers may want to increase customer goodwill by allowing customers to repeatedly
match with their favorite service provider; however this may reduce the options available for other
consumers and harm platform growth. There are also many models of commitment beyond our
specific formulation that can be used to study a wider range of applications.
References
Philipp Afeche, Zhe Liu, and Costis Maglaras. 2018. Ride-hailing networks with strategic drivers: The
impact of platform control capabilities on performance. Columbia Business School Research Paper
18-19 (2018), 18–19.
Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li, and Shayan Oveis Gharan. 2017. Thickness and information in dynamic
matching markets. (2017).
Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, and Yash Kanoria. 2017. Efficient dynamic barter exchange.
Operations Research 65, 6 (2017), 1446–1459.
Nick Arnosti, Ramesh Johari, and Yash Kanoria. 2018. Managing congestion in matching markets. Available
at SSRN 2427960 (2018).
Nick Arnosti and Peng Shi. 2017. Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation.
Columbia Business School Research Paper 17-52 (2017).
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, and Vahideh Manshadi. 2019. On matching and thickness in
heterogeneous dynamic markets. Operations Research (2019).
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, and Amin Saberi. 2018. Maximizing efficiency in dynamic
matching markets. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.01285 (2018).
Baris Ata, Deishin Lee, and Erkut Sonmez. 2016. Dynamic staffing of volunteer gleaning operations. Available
at SSRN 2873250 (2016).
Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, and Leeat Yariv. 2018. Optimal dynamic matching. (2018).
Francis Bloch and Nicolas Houy. 2012. Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents. Economic
Theory 51, 1 (2012), 13–33.
Yiwei Chen and Ming Hu. 2019. Pricing and matching with forward-looking buyers and sellers. Manufacturing
& Service Operations Management (2019).
Davide Crapis, Bar Ifrach, Costis Maglaras, and Marco Scarsini. 2017. Monopoly pricing in the presence of
social learning. Management Science 63, 11 (2017), 3586–3608.
John P Dickerson, Ariel D Procaccia, and Tuomas Sandholm. 2012. Dynamic matching via weighted myopia
with application to kidney exchange. In Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Jing Dong and Rouba Ibrahim. 2017. Managing Supply in the On-Demand Economy: Flexible Workers or
Full-Time Employees? Available at SSRN 2971841 (2017).
Lo et al.: Options versus Adoption
21
Itai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo, and Jay Sethuraman. 2017. Dynamic Matching in School Choice:
Efficient Seat Reassignment after Late Cancellations. Columbia Business School Research Paper 17-68
(2017).
Linda V Green, Sergei Savin, and Nicos Savva. 2013. Nursevendor problem: Personnel staffing in the presence
of endogenous absenteeism. Management Science 59, 10 (2013), 2237–2256.
Hanna Halaburda, Miko laj Jan Piskorski, and Pınar Yıldırım. 2017. Competing by restricting choice: The
case of matching platforms. Management Science 64, 8 (2017), 3574–3594.
Ming Hu and Yun Zhou. 2018. Dynamic type matching. Rotman School of Management Working Paper
2592622 (2018).
Yash Kanoria and Daniela Saban. 2017. Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restrict-
ing Agents’ Actions. (2017).
Morimitsu Kurino. 2014. House allocation with overlapping generations. American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics 6, 1 (2014), 258–89.
Jacob Leshno. 2017. Dynamic matching in overloaded waiting lists. Available at SSRN 2967011 (2017).
Zhen Lian and Garrett van Ryzin. 2019. Optimal Growth in Two-Sided Markets. Available at SSRN 3310559
(2019).
Michael Locke, Angela Ellis, and Justin Davis Smith. 2003. Hold on to what youve got: the volunteer
retention literature. Voluntary Action 5, 3 (2003), 81–99.
Simon Loertscher, Ellen V Muir, and Peter G Taylor. 2016. Optimal market thickness and clearing. Technical
Report. Working Paper, University of Melbourne, Deparment of Mathematics and Statistics.
Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, and David C Parkes. 2018. Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1801.04015 (2018).
Andrew Mastin and Patrick Jaillet. 2013. Greedy online bipartite matching on random graphs. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1307.2536 (2013).
Erhun Ozkan and Amy Ward. 2017. Dynamic matching for real-time ridesharing. Available at SSRN 2844451
(2017).
Scott E Sampson. 2006. Optimization of volunteer labor assignments. Journal of Operations Management
24, 4 (2006), 363–377.
Xuanming Su and Stefanos A Zenios. 2005. Patient choice in kidney allocation: A sequential stochastic
assignment model. Operations research 53, 3 (2005), 443–455.
Nicholas C Wormald et al. 1999. Models of random regular graphs. London Mathematical Society Lecture
Note Series (1999), 239–298.
Stefanos A Zenios. 2002. Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program. Management Science 48, 3
(2002), 328–342.
Lo et al.: Options versus Adoption
22
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
To aid in this proof, we define constants ∆t and Φt, where ∆t is defined such that with probability 1−
O(n1/4e−c
6n1/4), ∣∣∣∣Sn(n(dt− kt), n(vt− kt))n − s(dt− kt, vt− kt)
∣∣∣∣≤∆tn−1/4 (19)
We defer a proof that such a choice of ∆t is possible until we prove Proposition 2 in Appendix B.1. In
addition, Φ−1 = 0 and for all t∈ [T ], Φt :=
∑t
τ=0(3 +α+α
′+β′+ γ′)t−τ∆τ .
We now prove by induction that for all t∈ [T ], with probability 1−O((t+ 1)n1/4e−c6n1/4),∣∣∣∣Kntn − kt
∣∣∣∣≤Φt−1n−1/4 (20)∣∣∣∣Dntn − dt
∣∣∣∣≤ (1 +β′)Φt−1n−1/4 (21)∣∣∣∣V ntn − vt
∣∣∣∣≤ (1 +α+α′+ γ′)Φt−1n−1/4 (22)∣∣∣∣Mntn −mt
∣∣∣∣≤Φtn−1/4 (23)
We note that the final inequality will be proved using the previous three inequalities as part of its inductive
hypothesis.
The base cases for equations (20)-(22) are straightforward, since both sides of each inequality equals 0
by definition. The base case for (23) follows directly from the definition of Φ0 (above) and the proof of
Proposition 2 (deferred to Appendix B.1).
We now assume that this holds for t= τ . We will prove that the statement also holds for t= τ + 1. We
proceed in order: ∣∣∣∣Knτ+1n − kτ+1
∣∣∣∣≤ ∣∣∣∣Knτ+1n −E
[
Knτ+1
n
|Mnτ
]∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣E[Knτ+1n |Mτ
]
− kτ+1
∣∣∣∣ (24)
=
∣∣∣∣Knτ+1n − (1− γ)zτMnτn
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣(1− γ)zτMnτn − (1− γ)zτmτ
∣∣∣∣ (25)
=
1
n
∣∣Knτ+1− (1− γ)zτMnτ ∣∣+ (1− γ)zτ ∣∣∣∣Mnτn −mτ
∣∣∣∣ (26)
By the inductive hypothesis, with probability 1−O((τ + 1)n1/4e−c6n1/4), we can bound the second term by
(1−γ)zτΦτn−1/4. We will use a Chernoff bound on the first term, recalling that Knτ+1 is a binomial random
variable. Thus, with probability 1− en−1/2 ,
1
n
|Knτ+1− (1− γ)zτMnτ | ≤ n−5/4
√
2(1− γ)zτMnτ (27)
Assuming the bound in the second term holds, Mnτ is O(n), which means that for large enough
n, n−5/4
√
2(1− γ)zτMnτ ≤ γzτΦτn−1/4. Thus, taking a union bound, we have with probability 1 −
O
(
(τ + 1)n1/4e−c
6n1/4
)
, ∣∣∣∣Knτ+1n − kτ+1
∣∣∣∣≤Φτn−1/4 (28)
This proves by induction that (20) holds for all t∈ [T ].
We repeat a nearly identical process for
∣∣∣Dnτ+1n − dτ+1∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣V nτ+1n − vτ+1∣∣∣, using Chernoff bounds two and
three times, respectively, due to the additional binomial processes.
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For the final step, we use techniques from Wormald et al. (1999) to prove the convergence of the matching
function conditional on the current state, and then we leverage the sublinearity of the matching function to
bound the distance between the matching resulting from the actual state and the deterministic approximation
of the matching in period τ .
∣∣∣∣Mnτ+1n −mτ+1
∣∣∣∣≤ ∣∣∣∣Mnτ+1n − Knτ+1n − s
(
Dnτ+1−Knτ+1
n
,
V nτ+1−Knτ+1
n
)∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣Knτ+1n + s
(
Dnτ+1−Knτ+1
n
,
V nτ+1−Knτ+1
n
)
−mτ+1
∣∣∣∣ (29)
≤
∣∣∣∣Snτ+1n − s
(
Dnτ+1−Knτ+1
n
,
V nτ+1−Knτ+1
n
)∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣Dnτ+1n − dτ+1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣Knτ+1n − kτ+1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣V nτ+1n − vτ+1
∣∣∣∣ (30)
In the first term, we cancel out the certain adopted matches. We then break the second term into three terms,
utilizing the fact that ∂mt
∂dt
∈ [0,1], as are ∂mt
∂kt
and ∂mt
∂vt
(we defer presentation of these partial derivatives to
Appendix B.3).
With probability 1−O
(
n1/4e−c
6n1/4
)
, the first term is less than ∆τ+1n
−1/4 (this comes from the definition
of ∆t, based on the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix B.1). Taking a union bound over three of our inductive
hypotheses, with probability 1−O((τ + 1)n1/4e−c6n1/4),∣∣∣∣Dnτ+1n − dτ+1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣Knτ+1n − kτ+1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣V nτ+1n − vτ+1
∣∣∣∣≤ (3 +α+α′+β′+ γ′)Φτn−1/4 (31)
Combining the bounds on these two terms via one union bound, we see that with probability 1−O((τ +
2)n1/4e−c
6n1/4), ∣∣∣∣Mnτ+1n −mτ+1
∣∣∣∣≤ (3 +α+α′+β′+ γ′)Φτn−1/4 + ∆τ+1n−1/4 = Φτ+1n−1/4 (32)
This completes the proof by induction. To show that this convergence result holds for all t∈ [T ], we can take
another union bound over the 4T state variables. Since T =O(1), with probability 1−O(n1/4e−c6n1/4), for
all t∈ [T ], ∣∣∣∣Kntn − kt
∣∣∣∣≤O (n−1/4) (33)∣∣∣∣Dntn − dt
∣∣∣∣≤O (n−1/4) (34)∣∣∣∣V ntn − vt
∣∣∣∣≤O (n−1/4) (35)∣∣∣∣Mntn −mt
∣∣∣∣≤O (n−1/4) (36)
This completes the proof of almost sure convergence.
Appendix B: Missing Proofs from Section 3
B.1. Remaining Details in the Proof of Proposition 2
In Section 3.1, we showed that
E [Y (Z + 1)−Y (Z) | Y (Z)] = 1−
(
1− c
n
)n(a−Y (Z)n )
(37)
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To complete the proof of Proposition 2, we apply Theorem 5.1 from Wormald et al. (1999). Using identical
notation to the statement of that theorem, we use a domain D defined by z ∈ (−, b+ ) and y ∈ (−δ, a+ δ).
To satisfy the boundedness hypothesis, we set β = 1 and γ = 0 because with probability 1, we have
E[Y (Z + 1)− Y (Z)|Y (Z)]≤ 1. Turning our attention to the trend hypothesis, we first note for any x≥ 0,
e−x−x
2 ≤ 1−x≤ e−x. Setting x= c
n
and raising each term to the n
(
a− Y (Z)
n
)
power yields
e
(
−c− c2
n
)
(a−Y (Z)n ) ≤
(
1− c
n
)n(a−Y (Z)n ) ≤ e−c(a−Y (Z)n ) (38)
e(−c)(a−
Y (Z)
n
)
(
1− c
2(a− Y (Z)
n
)
n
)
≤
(
1− c
n
)n(a−Y (Z)n ) ≤ e−c(a−Y (Z)n ) (39)
e(−c)(a−
Y (Z)
n )(1− c
2
n
)≤
(
1− c
n
)n(a−Y (Z)n ) ≤ e−c(a−Y (Z)n ) (40)
Since c
2
n
e(−c)(a−
Y (Z)
n ) ≤ c2
n
, we can set λ1 =
c2
n
to satisfy the trend hypothesis.
Finally, we note that the constant L= c2ecδ satisfies the Lipschitz condition for the function 1−e−c(a−y(z))
over domain D.
Given that the conditions of Theorem 5.1 in Wormald et al. (1999) are met, we define λ= c2n−1/4 to yield
that for all z ∈ [0,1], with probability 1−O(n1/4e−c6n1/4),
Y (nz) = ny(z) +O
(
n3/4
)
(41)
Plugging in z = b completes that proof that the expected matching converges almost surely to a + b −
1
c
log(eca + ecb − 1). In addition, this implies that there is some constant ∆(a, b) whose magnitude depends
on the initial conditions such that |Snt
n
− st| ≤∆n−1/4. The constants ∆t in Line (19) of Appendix A are
defined to equal ∆(dt− kt, vt− kt).
B.2. Proof of Theorem 1
We begin by showing that m1(z0) does not attain a local maximum. From (5)-(7), we have
∂d1
∂z0
= 0, ∂k1
∂z0
=
(1− γ)m0, and ∂v1∂z0 = (α−α′− γ)m0. Combining these derivatives with (4) and (8), we have
m1 = d1− k1 + v1− 1
c
log(ec(d1−k1) + ec(v1−k1)− 1) (42)
∂m1
∂z0
=
(
(α−α′− γ)ec(d1−k1) + (1 +α′−α)
ec(d1−k1) + ec(v1−k1)− 1
)
m0 (43)
∂2m1
∂z20
=
(
(1− γ)2ec(d1−k1) + (1 +α′−α)2ec(v1−k1)− (α−α′− γ)2ec(d1+v1−2k1)
(ec(d1−k1) + ec(v1−k1)− 1)2
)
m20 (44)
The first-order condition prescribed by (43) is equivalent to ec(d1−k1) = 1+α
′−α
α−α′−γ . When the FOC holds, the
numerator of (44) reduces to (1− γ)2ec(d1−k1) + (1− γ)(1 +α′ −α)ec(v1−k1), which must be positive. Thus,
m1 can have no local maxima as a function of z0, so the optimal solution must be at a boundary, i.e., z0 = 0
or z0 = 1.
Using the definitions in (4)-(8), we see that m1(0)≥m1(1) if and only if
d1(0) + v1(0)− k1(0)− 1
c
log(ec(d1(0)−k1(0)) + ec(v1(0)−k1(0))− 1)≥
d1(1) + v1(1)− k1(1)− 1
c
log(ec(d1(1)−k1(1)) + ec(v1(1)−k1(1))− 1)
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Note that with a slight abuse of notation, we augment (d1, k1, v1) by zt to compare them for zt = 0 and
zt = 1. We have d1(0) = d1(1) := d1 and k1(0) = 0, so this condition reduces to
0≤ ec(v1(0)−v1(1)+k1(1))− e
cv1(0) + ecd1 − 1
ec(v1(1)−k1(1)) + ec(d1−k1(1))− 1 (45)
0≤ ec(1−α+α′)m0(ecd1e−c(1−γ)m0 − 1)− ecd1 + 1 (46)
0≤ ecd1(ec(γ+α′−α)− 1)− (ec(1−α+α′)− 1) (47)
Line (46) comes from multiplying by the denominator and using the equalities v1(0) − v1(1) + k1(1) =
(1−α+α′)m0 and k1(1) = (1− γ)m0. Algebraically, this is equivalent to the two conditions in (13).
B.3. Proof of Claim 1
We proceed via induction. We have as a base case d0 ≥ d′0, v0 ≥ v′0, and m0 ≥m′0. Suppose this holds for
all periods t≤ τ . We will show it holds for t= τ + 1. Based on the dynamics described in (5)-(7), since the
platform’s policy decision in period τ is assumed to be fixed, we have
dτ+1 = (1−β)dτ +β′mτ ≥ (1−β)d′τ +β′m′τ ≥ d′τ+1 (48)
kτ+1 = (1− γ)zτmτ ≥ (1− γ)zτm′τ ≥ k′τ+1 (49)
vτ+1 = (1−α)vτ + (α′+ γ′)mτ + (α−α′− γ)zτmτ
≥ (1−α)v′τ + (α′+ γ′)m′τ + (α−α′− γ)zτm′τ ≥ v′τ+1 (50)
To complete the proof of the claim, we need to show that mτ+1 is non-decreasing in dτ , kτ , and mτ . By
the chain rule, it is sufficient to show that mτ+1 as defined in (4) is increasing in dτ+1, vτ+1, and kτ+1. We
establish this directly, using the matching function defined in (8).
∂mτ+1
∂dτ+1
= 1− e
c(dτ+1−kτ+1)
ec(dτ+1−kτ+1) + ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)− 1 =
ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)− 1
ec(dτ+1−kτ+1) + ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)− 1 ∈ [0,1] (51)
∂mτ+1
∂vτ+1
= 1− e
c(vτ+1−kτ+1)
ec(dτ+1−kτ+1) + ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)− 1 =
ec(dτ+1−kτ+1)− 1
ec(dτ+1−kτ+1) + ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)− 1 ∈ [0,1] (52)
∂mτ+1
∂kτ+1
=−1 + e
c(dτ+1−kτ+1) + ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)
ec(dτ+1−kτ+1) + ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)− 1 =
1
ec(dτ+1−kτ+1) + ec(vτ+1−kτ+1)− 1 ∈ [0,1] (53)
This shows that mτ+1 ≥m′τ+1, which completes the proof by induction.
B.4. Proof of Theorem 3
To prove this theorem, we first show that (MMS) has a unique solution in the AGN regime. Then we show
that if dτ ≥ d¯, zτ = 0 is optimal. Finally, we show that the thresholds define an absorbing state, i.e., if dτ ≥ d¯
and vτ ≥ v¯, then dτ+1 ≥ d¯ and vτ+1 ≥ v¯. This implies that dt ≥ d¯ for all t ∈ [T ] \ [τ − 1], so in those periods,
zt = 0 must be optimal.
To show that (MMS) has a unique solution, it is sufficient to prove that the right hand sides of (14) and
(15) have slope less than 1 and that the right hand sides of (16) and (17) have slopes in [0,1] with respect
to the decision variables. In that case, (17) must be tight at any optimal solution. Applying the chain rule,
the right hand sides of (14)-(16) must have slopes less than 1 as a function of d. Thus, a linear search for
the first value of d to satisfy all three constraints solves the problem.
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Clearly the right hand side of (14) is increasing with slope less than 1 (it is a constant). For the other
three constraints, we can exploit their common structure. We will prove that the general function f(x) =
1
c
log( e
cζ1x−1
ecζ2x−1 ) satisfies f
′(x)< 1 when 0< ζ2 < ζ1 < 1 + ζ2.
df
dx
=
ζ1e
cζ1x
ecζ1x− 1 −
ζ2e
cζ2x
ecζ2x− 1 (54)
= ζ1− ζ2 + ζ1
ecζ1x− 1 −
ζ2
ecζ2x− 1 (55)
≤ ζ1− ζ2 (56)
< 1 (57)
Line (56) comes from noting that ζ
ecxζ−1 is decreasing in ζ, so
ζ1
ecζ1x−1 − ζ2ecζ2x−1 ≤ 0. This immediately shows
that the right hand sides of (16) and (17) both have slopes less than 1. Similarly, the right hand side of (15)
must have a slope less than 1−β
′
1−β < 1.
We also note that ζ + ζ
ecxζ−1 is increasing in ζ, which means that according to (54),
df
dx
≥ 0. This implies
that (16) and (17) are weakly increasing in both decision variables. This completes the proof that there is a
unique solution to (MMS) which can be found via a linear search on d.
We now show that if dτ ≥ d¯, zτ = 0 is optimal. By appealing to Lemma 1 in the AGN regime, it is sufficient
to show that dτ+1 ≥ 1c log
(
ec(1+α
′−α)mτ−1
ec(γ+α
′−α)mτ−1
)
. Using (5) to rewrite dτ+1 in terms of dτ and mτ , we find that
the above condition is equivalent to
dτ ≥ 1
c(1−β) log
(
ec(1+α
′−α)mτ − 1
ec(γ+α′−α)mτ − 1
)
− β
′
1−βmτ
This threshold is convex in mτ , so its maximum value over its domain must occur when mτ = dτ or when
mτ = 0. Constraint (15) ensures that dτ exceeds the threshold when mτ = dτ , while constraint (14) ensures
that dτ exceeds the threshold when mτ = 0 (recall that we defined the threshold to equal its limiting value
when mτ = 0). This means that if these two constraints are satisfied, the optimal single-period policy is
zτ = 0. Since we are in the AGN regime, applying Lemma 1 proves that the optimal policy is zτ = 0.
We now show that d¯ and v¯ define an absorbing state when the platform follows a policy of no adoption.
We define
m¯ := s(d¯, v¯) = d¯+ v¯− 1
c
log(ecd¯ + ecv¯ − 1) (58)
Since the matching function in (8) is increasing in each side of the market, m¯ represents the minimum number
of matches when dτ ≥ d¯ and vτ ≥ v¯.
By constraint (16), d¯≥ 1
c
log
(
epv¯−1
e
pv¯(1− α
α′+γ′ )−1
)
. Rearranging terms, we have
e
c(d¯+v¯(1− α
α′+γ′ )) ≥ ecd¯ + ecv¯ − 1 (59)
≥ ec(d¯+v¯−m¯) (60)
Line (60) comes from rearranging the definition of m¯ in (58). This inequality is equivalent to d¯+ v¯(1− α
α′+γ′ ≥
d¯+ v¯− m¯. Rearranging terms, we see that
v¯≤ (1−α)v¯+ (α′+ γ′)m¯ (61)
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If vτ ≥ v¯ and dτ ≥ v¯, we must have mτ ≥ m¯ since the matching function is increasing in both sides of the
matching market. Thus,
v¯≤ (1−α)vτ + (α′+ γ′)mτ = vτ+1(0) (62)
An identical proof using constraint (17) shows that d¯≤ dτ+1(0) when vτ ≥ v¯ and dτ ≥ v¯. Thus, when following
a policy of no adoption, v¯ and d¯ define an absorbing state where no adoption remains the optimal policy.
B.5. Proof of Theorem 4
For ease of notation throughout the proof, we define constants A1 := max{1 − β + β′,1 − α + α′ + γ′},
A2 := min{1−β+β′,1−α+α′+ γ′} and A3 := max{β′, α′+ γ′}.
We first establish an upper bound on the value of the platform design problem. Then, for each period, we
upper bound the difference between the number of completed jobs when following a no-adoption policy and
the number of jobs completed in the upper bound. Ultimately, this allows us to lower bound the performance
of a static no-adoption policy as a function of the upper bound on the value of the platform design problem.
Consider a modified setting where the matching in each period is equal to the small side in the matching
market, e.g., mˆt(dt, kt, vt) = min{dt, vt}. We will call this the match-min setting, and we will use consistent
notation to indicate the state variables in the match-min setting, e.g. dˆt+1 = (1−β)dˆt+β′mˆt. In this setting,
the platform’s decision at time t only impacts mˆt+1 through its impact on vˆt+1. Thus, in the AGN regime,
the platform’s optimal policy is to set zt = 0 for all t ∈ [T ], which maximizes the growth of the worker side
of the market.
We remark that the the size of the matching as given in (8) is less than the minimum side of the market:
mt(dt, kt, vt) = dt + vt− kt− 1
c
log(ec(dt−kt) + ec(vt−kt)− 1) (63)
= min{dt, vt}− 1
c
log(1 + ec(min{dt,vt}−max{dt,vt})− e−c(max{dt,vt}−kt)) (64)
≤min{dt, vt} (65)
Thus, given the same initial state (d0, k0, v0) and the same policy choice z0, we have mˆ1 ≥m1, dˆ1 ≥ d1, and
vˆ1 ≥ v1. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, these inequalities will continue to hold for all
t∈ [T ] as long as the policies zt are identical. As a consequence, the value of completed jobs in the match-min
setting when zt = 0 for all t∈ [T ] is an upper bound on the value of the platform design problem. The value
of this upper bound is given by
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1mˆt.
We now place a lower bound on the ratio
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1mt∑T
t=1 δ
t−1mˆt
= 1 −
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1(mˆt−mt)∑T
t=1 δ
t−1mˆt
, where mt represents the
number of matches in period t when the platform follows a static policy of no adoption and the matching
output is determined by (8). We start by lower-bounding
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1mˆt.
T∑
t=1
δt−1mˆt =
T∑
t=1
δt−1 min{dˆt, vˆt} ≥
T∑
t=1
δt−1(A2)
tmin{d0, v0}=A2 min{d0, v0}1− (A2δ)
T
1−A2δ (66)
Now we must place an upper bound on
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1(mˆt−mt). From line (64), we see that mt ≥min{dt, vt}−
1
c
log(2). This allows us to upper bound the difference between mˆt and mt in any period t∈ [T ]:
mˆt−mt ≤min{dˆt, vˆt}−min{dt, vt}+ 1
c
log(2) (67)
≤max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt}+ 1
c
log(2) (68)
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To place an upper bound on max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt}, note that when the platform follows a static policy of no
adoption, the worker dynamics are given by
vt+1 = (1−α)vt + (α′+ γ′)mt (69)
≥ (1−α)vt + (α′+ γ′)(min{dt, vt}− 1
c
log(2)) (70)
= (1−α)vˆt + (α′+ γ′)(min{dˆt, vˆt})− (1−α)(vˆt− vt)−
(α′+ γ′)(min{dˆt, vˆt}−min{dt, vt})− α
′+ γ′
c
log(2) (71)
≥ vˆt+1− (1−α)(vˆt− vt)− (α′+ γ′)(max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt})− α
′+ γ′
c
log(2) (72)
≥ vˆt+1− (1−α+α′+ γ′)(max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt})− α
′+ γ′
c
log(2) (73)
Similarly,
dt+1 ≥ (1−β)dt + (β′)(min{dt, vt}− 1
c
log(2)) (74)
= (1−β)dˆt + (β′)(min{dˆt, vˆt})− (1−β)(dˆt− dt)−
(β′)(min{dˆt, vˆt}−min{dt, vt})− β
′
c
log(2) (75)
≥ dˆt+1− (1−β)(dˆt− dt)− (β′)(max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt})− β
′
c
log(2) (76)
≥ dˆt+1− (1−β+β′)(max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt})− β
′
c
log(2) (77)
We can combine these two inequalities to yield
max{dˆt+1− dt+1, vˆt+1− vt+1} ≤max{(1−β+β′), (1−α+α′+ γ′)}max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt}
+
max{β′, α′+ γ′}
c
log(2) (78)
=A1 max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt}+ A3
c
log(2) (79)
Given initial condition max{dˆ0− d0, vˆ0− v0}= 0, we have
max{dˆt− dt, vˆt− vt} ≤ A3 log(2)
c
t−1∑
τ=0
Aτ1 (80)
=
A3 log(2)(A
t
1− 1)
c(A1− 1) (81)
Taking a discounted sum of (68) over all t ∈ [T ], the difference in the total value of completed jobs is given
by
T∑
t=1
δt−1(mˆt−mt)≤
T∑
t=1
δt−1
(
log(2)
c
+
A3 log(2)(A
t
1− 1)
c(A1− 1)
)
(82)
=
log(2)
c(A1− 1)
T∑
t=1
δt−1(A1− 1−A3 +A3At1)) (83)
=
log(2)
c(A1− 1)
(
(A1− 1−A3)(1− δT )
1− δ +
A1A3(1− (δA1)T )
1− δA1
)
(84)
≤ log(2)
c(1− δ) +
A3 log(2)(1− (δA1)T )
c(1− δ)(1− δA1) (85)
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Using this result and the upper bound from (66), we can place a lower bound on the approximation factor
of a no-adoption policy:
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1(mt)∑T
t=1 δ
t−1(mˆt)
= 1−
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1(mˆt−mt)∑T
t=1 δ
t−1(mˆt)
(86)
≥ 1−
log(2)
c(1−δ) +
A3 log(2)(1−(δA1)T )
c(1−δ)(1−δA1)
A2 min{d0, v0} 1−(A2δ)T1−A2δ
(87)
≥ 1−
log(2)( 1
1−(δA1)T +
A3
1−δA1 )
cmin{d0, v0} (88)
In these steps, we require δA1 < 1 for the lower bounds to hold. This is equivalent to the approximation
factor reported in Theorem 4.
